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THE INEQUITABLE TAX TREATMENT OF
EXPENSES INCIDENT TO CHARITABLE SERVICE
JOEL S. NEWMAN*
INTRODUCTION

W

HY are the expenses of commuting from home to place of gainful
employment not deductible as business expenses, while the expenses of commuting from home to place of volunteer work are
deductible as charitable contributions?1 Conversely, why may a pro
rata portion of an automobile's depreciation be deducted if the automobile is used partly for pleasure and partly for business, while no
depreciation may be deducted if the automobile is used partly for
pleasure and partly for charitable purposes? 2 It is submitted that these
expenses incident to deduction-creating activities should be treated
consistently.
The Internal Revenue Code provides for different tax treatment of
various deductible items and activities. Some deductions figure in the
computation of adjusted gross income; 3 others do not. Some deductions have specific statutory floors, 4 ceilings,- and carryover characteristics; 6 others do not. These statutory distinctions, however, do not
justify diverse tax treatment of expenses incident to the deductions.
Absent specific statutory differentiation, these expenses should be
7
treated similarly.
Occasionally, differential treatment of incidental expenses is justified
by obvious differences in the nature of certain deductions. In other
instances, however, no rational explanation exists for the disparate
treatment. A comparison of the treatment of expenses incident to trade
or business activities with the treatment of expenses incident to charitable activities reveals a somewhat inconsistent tax policy that overwhelmingly favors business over charity. Instances in which expenses
incident to business and charitable activities receive equal tax treat* Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5), T.D. 6796, 1965-1 C.B. 142 with Rev. Rul. 56-503,
1956-2 C.B. 126.
2. Compare Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953, 972-73 (1964) with I.R.C. § 167.
3. See I.R-C. § 62 (e.g., moving expenses, alimony).
4. See, e.g., id. § 213 (deduction for medical expenses in excess of 3 of adjusted gross
income).
5. See, e.g., id. § 170(b) (percentage limitations for charitable contributions).
6. See, e.g., id. §§ 170(d) (carryover of excess charitable contributions), 172 (carryback and
carryover of net operating losses).
7. Despite certain statutory distinctions, all deductions are similar in that they reduce the
amount of taxable income and are allowed as a matter of legislative grace. See generally
Griswold, An Argument against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as
a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142 (1943).
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ment and instances in which charitable pursuits are favored are rare.8
Expenses incident to business activities consistently receive more
favorable tax treatment than expenses incident to charitable activities. 9
I.

RARE INSTANCES OF ACCEPTABLE TREATMENT

A.

Equal Treatment-Meals and Lodging

A taxpayer who eats lunch in a restaurant near his place of work
invariably spends more for the meal than he would spend if he ate
lunch at home. The taxpayer thereby incurs an increased expense as a
result of trade or business activity. Yet, he could bring a sandwich to
work or go home for lunch. Therefore, the reasons for the increased
expense are two: the job and the personal decision to eat at a
restaurant.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that business expenses are
deductible, whereas personal expenses are not.10 Amounts expended
for meals during a working day are considered personal expenses. To
allow a tax deduction for such meals would subsidize those who make
a personal decision to eat out, and penalize those who go home or
bring a sandwich for lunch. Only when the personal choice is illusory
may the price of a meal be considered a business expense. This premise
is the foundation of the overnight rule in United States v. Correll.I"
When a business trip takes one away from home overnight, the
expense and inconvenience of doing anything but eating out make the
alternatives to eating out all but illusory. To a reasonable businessman
on an overnight trip there is no real choice but to eat in a restaurant,
and the expense of the meal is incurred solely for business reasons.
Thus, Correll establishes the rule that if a taxpayer is away from home
overnight on a business trip, his meal and lodging expenses are
deductible. 12 Otherwise, the expenses of meals during the working day
are personal and nondeductible. 13
The overnight rule has similarly been applied in the area of charitable contributions. 14 "Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging
necessarily incurred while away from home in the course of performing
donated services also are deductible."' 5 The choice of eating at home
8. See pt. I infra.
9. See pt. II infra.
10. Compare I.R.C. § 162 with id. § 262.
11. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
12. Id. at 304-05.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5), T.D. 6796, 1965-1 C.B. 142.
14. See Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Clark v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
(P-H) 510 (1970); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953 (1964); Rev. Rul. 67-362, 1967-2 C.B.
117; Rev. Rul. 65-285, 1965-2 C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 57-38, 1957-1 C.B. 96; Rev. Rul. 56-508,
1956-2 C.B. 126; Rev. Rul. 55-4, 1955-1 C.B. 291.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-(g) (1972).

CHARITABLE EXPENSES
or in a restaurant and the factors that make such a choice real or
illusory are the same whether the taxpayer works for pay or for
charity. Accordingly, the situations are directly comparable, and identical tax treatment of the expenses incurred during the course of the
activities logically follows.
B.

Charity over Business-Commuting Expenses

Absent exceptional circumstances, the cost of commuting from residence to place of trade or business is considered a personal expense
and, as such, is not deductible. 16 This rule is justified by the Supreme
Court's analysis in Commissioner v. Flowers. 17 The taxpayer in Flowers resided and maintained a law office in Jackson, Mississippi. In
addition, he worked in Mobile, Alabama as general solicitor for a
railroad company. His claim that the expenses he incurred in traveling
between the two cities were deductible was denied. In upholding the
denial, the Court noted that the travel expenses "were incurred solely
as the result of the taxpayer's desire to maintain a home in Jackson
while working in Mobile, a factor irrelevant to the maintenance and
18
prosecution of the railroad's legal business."
The rationale underlying the denial of a deduction for commuting
expenses is comparable to the basis for the overnight rule discussed
previously. 19 Commuting expenses result in part from the act of
engaging in a trade or business and in part from the personal decision
to live at a distance from one's place of work. Faced with an expense
incurred for both business and personal reasons, the law again has
determined that the personal motive shall prevail.2 0
In seemingly striking contrast, the expenses of commuting from
home to place of charitable work are fully deductible. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has ruled that a taxpayer who does volunteer work at her church and at a local hospital may deduct commuting
expenses incurred in the performance of those services . 2 The ruling
attempts to distinguish business-related commuting from charityrelated commuting as follows:
It has long been held that commuting expenses between a taxpayer's residence and his
principal or regular place of employment are not business expenses but personal
expenses since they are not incurred in carrying on the business and are not made for
the benefit of the employer but for the employee's own benefit. . . Conversely, it is
believed that the transportation expenses herein discussed are not personal expenses
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5), T.D. 6796, 1965-1 C.B. 142
17. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
18. Id. at 473.
19. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
20. See Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for
Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 Cornell L. Rev 871 (1969).
21. Rev. Rul. 56-508, 1956-2 C.B. 126.
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because fundamentally they are not incurred for the benefit of the taxpayer herself but
for the benefit
of the organization or activity for which she performs such gratuitous
22
services.

The benefit analysis set forth in the ruling seems flawed in light of
the fact that the taxpayer would not similarly be permitted to deduct
her expenses for meals. Does the taxpayer's bus fare benefit the charity
more than her lunch? Neither the meals nor the commuting benefits
the charity; both clearly benefit the donor. Yet, perceptible differences
between the meal expense and the transportation costs, as well as
between the business commuting and the charitable commuting, do
exist. These distinctions emerge, however, not from a benefit analysis,
but from a choice analysis.
In effect, taxpayers are expected either to bring their lunch to work
23
or to eat at home, whether they work for pay or for charity.
Similarly, salaried taxpayers are expected to live near their place of
work. Any other arrangement is the consequence of a personal choice,
and related expenses are therefore nondeductible. The tax system,
however, should not and does not require taxpayers to base their
24
choice of residence upon the location of their charitable work. It
would be unrealistic to do so; it is more realistic to expect that a
taxpayer's residence be dictated by his livelihood. Whether to live close
to or far from a place of charitable work presents a choice which is
unreasonable and thus unreal. As in the case of the overnight rule,
when the choice is not real, it is discounted. 2 5 Therefore, the commuting expense, which is incurred solely by the charitable work, is deductible. Thus, the disparate treatment of commuting expenses in the
business and charitable contexts is justifiable; it stems from an inherent
difference in the nature of the choice with which the taxpayer is
confronted with respect to each of the deduction-creating activities.
II.

INFERIOR TREATMENT

Charitable deductions have been afforded inferior treatment by
statute. They are limited to a myriad of percentage ceilings, 26 are
calculated after the computation of adjusted gross income, 27 and may
28
constitute an item of tax preference for purposes of the minimum tax.
22.

Id.

23. See
24. For
when, upon
services on
25. See
26.

at 127.

notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
example, it would be unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to move his residence
his retirement from a business located on the cast side, he elects to perform volunteer
the west side of town.
note 11 supra and accompanying text.

See I.R.C. § 170(b) (50%, 20%, or less of the contribution base, depending upon the

circumstances).
27. See id. § 62.
28. See id. § 56(b)(1).
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These specific statutory distinctions, however, do not justify discrimination against charitable deductions beyond the limits of the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.
Nevertheless, a taxpayer who engages in an activity with dual
motivations generally receives more favorable tax treatment if his
mixed motives are personal-business than if they are personal-charitable. Moreover, it is far better for tax purposes to combine personal
use of an item with business rather than charitable use. The inferior
treatment of expenses incident to charitable deduction-creating activities must be examined on its own merits.
A.

Mixed Motivations

If a taxpayer engages in an activity for both charitable and personal
reasons, he generally receives no deduction for his expenditures in
connection with that activity. In fact, the activity itself may not even
be considered a "contribution" within the meaning of section 170 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which governs charitable deductions. For
purposes of federal income taxation, the term "contribution" has been
held to have the same meaning as the term "gift."129 Therefore, the
guidelines suggested in Commissioner v. Duberstein3 0 -that transfers
arising from "the incentive of anticipated benefit ' 3 1 or "in return for
services rendered" 32 are not gifts, whereas those proceeding from a
"detached and disinterested generosity" 33 or "out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or like impulses" 34 are gifts--are applicable to
35
individual charitable contributions.
A detached and disinterested donative intent has become a primary
factor in determining the deductibility of a gift to charity. Courts have
often held that if the motivation for a transfer of goods or services to
charity includes an anticipated benefit to the donor, then the generosity
cannot be disinterested and the transfer cannot be considered a "con29. Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1975); Dockery v. Commissioner, [1978] Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) 78,063 (Feb. 21, 1978); Forkan v. Commissioner, 46
T.C.M. (P-H) 796 (1977); see Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970). cert
denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); In re Drage, [1978] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (78-2 U.S. Tax
Cas.) 9,632 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1978); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp.
91, 94 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962, 1008 (1976); Wolfe
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 641
(1966), aft'd, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967). Compare I.R.C. § 102
with id. § 170(a).
30.

363 U.S. 278 (1960).

31.

Id. at 285 (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)).

32. Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
33. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
34. Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
35.' The Duberstein guidelines, however, may not apply in the case of corporate charitable
contributions. United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522. 524 (9th Cir. 1968); Singer
Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421-23 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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tribution." 3 6 This rationale is creditable when a quid pro quo relationship exists between the goods or services donated and the benefit
derived by the donor. For instance, transfers to qualified charities in
exchange for a child's education, 37 adoption services, 38 or placement in
a nursing home3 9 are exchanges at arm's length and do not merit
treatment as charitable contributions. Similarly, when property rights
are exchanged for favorable action with respect to zoning or subdivision plats, charitable deductions are inappropriate. 40 These situations,
however, involve taxpayers who have no charitable motive rather than
taxpayers who are motivated by both charitable and personal concerns.
Before discussing the tax treatment accorded a donor who does anticipate some benefit but who has charitable motives as well, a conceptual difficulty must be clarified. All charitable contributions of goods
and services are made in partial anticipation of a benefit to the donor,
because qualified charities are dedicated to the public good. 4 1 All
donors, as members of the public, must derive some benefit from
charitable activity. It is established, however, that the anticipation of a
general benefit as a member of the community does not invalidate a
deduction; 42 only a specific, direct benefit to the donor will render the
charitable deduction questionable.4 3 Of course, the line can be very
36. See cases cited note 29 supra.
37. Cooper v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1959); Channing v. United States, 4
F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 67 F.2d 936 (Ist Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S.
686 (1934); Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971); Oppewal v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(P-H) 1238 (1971); McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233 (1968), aff'd, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 1763
(1st Cir. 1969); DeJong v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 896 (1961), aftd, 309 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1962).
38. Arceneaux v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1460 (1977); Murphy v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 249 (1970); McMillan v. Commissioner, 31 T.C 1143 (1959).
39. Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-2 C.B. 106. But see Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th
Cir. 1977); Estate of Wardwell v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962).
40. See Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 88(-87 (9th Cir. 1970); In re Drage, [19781
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (78-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9,632 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1978); Forkan
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 796 (1977); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 962 (1976); Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. .566 (1973); Sutton v. Commissioner, 57
T.C. 239 (1971); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311 (1965). But see Allen v. United States,
541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975); Anderson
v. United States, [19781 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) (73-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9,519 (D.S.D. June
16, 1978); Seldin v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 1318 (1969); Scheffres v. Commissioner, 38
T.C.M. (P-H) 249 (1969).
41. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A).
42. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Scharf
v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 1200 (1973). See also Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988
(1973).
43. See Dockery v. Commissioner, [1978] Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) 78,063 (Feb. 21, 1978);
Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265 (1971); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311 (1965);
Rev. Rul. 76-195, 1976-1 C.B. 61.
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difficult to draw in the case of a charitable contribution made by a
business entity; it is almost impossible for a business to make a
contribution without gaining specific promotional benefits."4 None of
the cases discussed for the purposes of this analysis involve businesses,
however, and all contemplate benefits that are sufficiently specific to
merit attention.
With respect to an individual who engages in an activity both for
charitable reasons and in anticipation of specific personal benefits,
the showing of a single substantial personal benefit has been held to
preclude any possibility of a charitable deduction. In Green v. Bookwalter 4 5 a member of the Kansas City Commission for International
Relations and Trade sought unsuccessfully to claim the expenses of a
factfinding trip to Latin America as a charitable deduction. The Green
court cited Better Business Bureau v. United States,4 6 a case in which
the Better Business Bureau unsuccessfully sought exemption from
social security taxes on the theory that it was operated exclusively for
educational purposes, and noted that in that case "[tlhe Supreme Court
• . . pointed out that a single substantial non-educational purpose
would destroy the exclusiveness of purpose which was the statutory
prerequisite for claiming exemption. '47 Applying the Better Business
Bureau language, the court then held that a "deduction cannot be
claimed under § 170(c) because [the] contribution cannot be said to
have been made 'exclusively for public purposes.' ",48
Two subsequent cases, Sheffels v. United States4 9 and Seed v.
Commissioner,5 0 involved the deductibility of travel expenses for trips
made under the auspices of the People-to-People Program. The Program was organized at the suggestion of President Eisenhower to
supplement the efforts of the government in broadening understanding
and friendship between Americans and people of other nations. The
People-to-People Committee sponsored trips by Americans to foreign
countries to further the aims of the Program. s l In Sheffels and Seed,
taxpayers who had taken Program-sponsored trips sought to deduct
their travel expenses as charitable contributions. In each case the court
conceded the fact that the expenses were partly a consequence of
charitable motivations;5 2 yet, in each case the court denied the claimed
44.

See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. CI. 1971).

45.

207 F. Supp. 866 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1963).

46.
47.

326 U.S. 279 (1945).
207 F. Supp. at 878.

48.

Id.

49.
50.

264 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 405 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1969).
57 T.C. 265 (1971).

51.
52.

Id. at 267.
Sheffels v. Commissioner, 264 F. Supp. at 89; Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. at 276.
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deduction. The Sheffels court cited Green and denied the deduction
because the taxpayer's contribution was not made "exclusively for
public purposes. ' 53 The Seed court cited Sheffels and stated:
Expenses incurred in the rendition of services to a qualified charitable organization
may, and often do, have a dual character. They may benefit both the charity and the
taxpayer. . .. [I]n such a situation it is important to distinguish between the direct
benefits which flow to the taxpayer as a consequence of payments to, or expenses
incurred for the use of, a qualified organization, and the benefits accruing to the
charity itself and only indirectly to the taxpayer as a member of the general public.
Although the charity may also benefit from such payments, the presence of substantial
direct personal benefit inuring to and anticipated by the taxpayer is fatal5 4 to any
characterization of the payment or expenses as "charitable contributions.1

Thus, the cases dealing with mixed charitable and personal motives
hold that even if some charitable contribution has been made, any
"substantial" personal benefit will destroy the charitable deduction.
The language of these cases can therefore be applied to disallow a
deduction, although the taxpayer's motive may be primarily charitable. 55 This standard differs markedly from that which is applied in the
business context:
If a taxpayer travels to a destination and while at such destination engages in both
business and personal activities, traveling expenses to and from such destination are
deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business ...
Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business or is5 6primarily
personal in nature depends on the facts and circumstances in each case.

In cases involving mixed business and personal motivations, deductibility of expenses is controlled by a primary purpose test: if an
activity is primarily business motivated, some or all of the expenses of
that activity may be deducted, despite the existence of a secondary
personal motive. 57 The business rule is considerably more lax than the
53.

264 F. Supp. at 89.

54. 57 T.C. at 276 (citations omitted). It should be noted, however, that the Seed court did
not negate the possibility of a partial deduction when the expenses are shown to exceed the benefit
to the donor. See id. at 278. See also Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975).
Of similar import as Sheffels and Seed is Saltzman v, Commissioner, 54 T.C. 722 (1970). In
Saltzman, the taxpayer volunteered his services as director of the Harvard-Radcliffe Folk Dance
Group-a qualified charitable organization-and claimed a charitable deduction in the amount of
his expenditures for trips to attend folk-dancing festivals. In denying the deduction, the court
commented that "the charitable deduction has not been allowed when the activity for which the
expenses are incurred brings a substantial personal benefit to the taxpayer, even though the
charity also benefits." Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
This analysis is not intended to suggest that the taxpayers in the cases discussed should have
been permitted to deduct their expenses, but rather to focus on the test and terminology employed
by the courts in denying the deductions.
55. But cf. Cartan v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 308, 321-22 (1958) (apparently applying a
primary purpose test to charitable expenses).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1)-(2) (1960).
57. For a stimulating critique of the primary purpose rule, see Halperin, Business Deduction
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standard applied to charity-related expenses. A taxpayer may engage
in an activity "primarily" for business reasons, and yet have a "sub-

stantial" personal motive. Such a set of mixed motives would qualify
for a deduction under the business-personal test, but would preclude a
deduction under the charitable-personal test.
There is no apparent justification for the more rigorous requirements

for mixed charitable-personal activities. The historical limitations imposed upon charitable deductions are based in large part upon the

supposition that such deductions are subject to extensive abuse. s8 Yet,

business deductions involving mixed motivations have long been a
prime source of taxpayer abuse." 9 The legislature has responded to
such abuses by enacting statutory guidelines that attempt to delineate

the parameters of acceptable business deductions in those categories

that are most troublesome. 60 It should be no more difficult to control

abuses in the charitable sphere. Salient abuses, with respect to both
business-personal and charitable-personal activities, should be curtailed legislatively.
B.

Mixed Uses

When a given item is used at times for business purposes and at
other times for personal purposes, not only are the specific expenses of
its business use deductible, but a portion of the general expenses
incident to its use are deductible as well. For example, when an
automobile is used for both business and pleasure, the taxpayer may
deduct not only his direct expenses but also a percentage allocation of
general expenses such as depreciation, repairs, and insurance. 6 ' In
contrast, when an item is used at times for charitable work and at
other times for personal activities, only the out-of-pocket expenses
solely and directly attributable to the charitable work may be deducted. 6 2 None of the general expenses mentioned above may be
allocated to the charitable portion and deducted. 6 3 This inequity is
for PersonalLiving Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev.
859 (1974); Klein, The Deductibility of TransportationExpenses of a Combination Business and
Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1099 (1966). For more explicit guidelines
with respect to certain specified activities, see I.R.C. § 274.
58. See generally Ostarch, Charitable Deductionsfor Individuals After the Tax Reform Act,
34 Tex. B.J. 961, 961 (1971).
59. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-35, reprinted in [19621 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3304, 3333-36.
60. See I.R.C. § 274 (restricting deductibility of, e.g., entertainment expenses).
61. See I.R.C. § 167(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. S1.
62. Rev. Rul. 76-89, 1976-1 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 69-645, 1969-2 C.B. 37; Rev. Rul. 67-362,
1967-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 67-30, 1967-1 C.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 66-10, 1966-1 C.B. 47; Rev. Rul.
61-46, 1961-1 C.B. 51; Rev. Rul. 59-160, 1959-1 C.B. 59; Rev. Rni. 58-240, 19S8-1 C.B. 141.
63. See Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965) (insurance, depreciation, and
repairs); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973) (repairs); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.
953 (1964) (depreciation); Rev. Rul. 58-279, 1958-1 C.B. 145 (repairs); cf. Weary v. United States,
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substantiated by the fact that, if a taxpayer uses an automobile partly
for deductible activities and wishes to deduct a standard amount per
mile rather than itemize expenses, he may deduct seventeen cents per
mile for business use, 64 but only seven cents per mile for charitable
use. 65
Three supportable arguments may be advanced against the allocation of general expenses of items used partly for charitable purposes.
Two of these arguments have general application, in theory if not in
fact; the third applies only to depreciation. First, it may be maintained
that such general expenses are not "for the use of" a qualified charity,
as required by statute. 66 Second, it may be argued that an allocation
of general expenses is tantamount to a claim that a partial interest in
67
the item itself has been donated and thus is precluded by statute.
Third, it may be contended that depreciation is neither an "out-ofpocket" expense nor an amount paid within the meaning of the statutes
and regulations. 6 8 The following analysis, however, reveals that these
arguments lack merit.
1. "For the use of"
Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code defines the term
"charitable contribution" as a contribution or gift "to or for the use of"
a qualified charity. 69 Courts have relied on this language to deny
deductions for expenses incident to charitable service. This reasoning
should be rejected for two reasons. First, the mixed motivations
argument, whether or not valid in itself, 70 has been improperly extended to a level of expenses to which it should have no application.
Second, the legislative history would tie the phrase "for the use of" to
the problem of private foundations, which is an entirely separate issue.
Orr v. United States7 1 illustrates the improper application of a mixed
motivations rationale to a mixed uses problem. In Orr, the taxpayer
used his own automobile and airplane in connection with volunteer
510 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.) (medical expenses), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975); Calafut v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1431 (1964) (same); Gordon v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 986
(1962) (same); Rev. Rul. 70-656, 1970-2 C.B. 67 (moving expenses); Rev. Rul. 69-473, 1969-2
C.B. 37 (housing); Rev. Rul. 66-10, 1966-1 C.B. 47 (same). But see Weinzimer v. Commissioner,
17 T.C.M. (CCH) 712 (1958) (medical expenses).
64. Rev. Proc. 77-40, 1977-2 C.B. 574, modifying Rev. Proc. 74-23, 1974-2 C.B. 476.
65. Rev. Proc. 74-24, 1974-2 C.B. 477.
66. See I.R.C § 170(c).
67. See id. § 170(0(3).
68. See id. § 170(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (1972).
69. I.R.C. § 170(c).
70. It has already been shown that the mixed motivations argument does not furnish a
rational basis for treating charitable activities differently from business activities. See pt. II(A)
supra.

71.

343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
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services for the Methodist Church. His attempt to deduct a pro rata
portion of the liability insurance payments on the two vehicles as part
of his charitable contribution was unsuccessful. The court commented:
Unlike his payments for oil and gasoline, expenses which were a direct result of the

travel for charitable purposes, the insurance premiums would have been paid even if
he had not done any charitable work at all. The words "gift to or for the use of" will
not stretch to include payments which the taxpayer would have made for non72

charitable reasons.

In pointing out that the taxpayer would have paid the insurance
premiums even without the charitable connection, the court implied
that the taxpayer himself derived some benefit from paying the premiums. This implication is strengthened by the court's statement that
"because the charity was not the sole beneficiary 7 3of the liability
insurance, the donor cannot deduct the premium.1
This "for the use of" argument in Orr, therefore, is related to the
mixed motivations argument discussed above. 74 In the mixed motivations cases, however, the original donation of goods and services was a
product of mixed motives. In Orr, the original donation of volunteer
services to the Methodist Church was made purely for charitable
purposes, and a second level of expenses was subjected to the substantial benefit test. 75 Once this test has been passed as to the original
services, it should not be administered again. At the second level, the
test should be one not of motives, but of attribution. An automobile
cannot be driven without incurring general expenses. If the automobile
is driven fifty percent of the time for charitable purposes, then fifty
percent of the general expenses should be attributable to the charitable
work. This attribution is accepted without further inquiry into motiva6
tion when an automobile is used for both business and pleasure.7
There is no reason to treat charitable uses any differently.
Other cases that have interpreted "for the use of" have emphasized
that the goods or services must be for the use of the charity, not of the
donor. 77 Still others have relied on the phrase to deny deductions to
donors who really are using the charitable organizations merely as
conduits for transfers to specific, noncharitable entities.78 These two
lines of cases are also restatements of the mixed motivations problem.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
See
343
See

77.

See Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Ct. C1. 1971); Estate of Carroll v.

at 557.
pt. 11(A) supra.
F.2d at 557.
note 61 supra and accompanying text.

Commissioner, 38 T.C. 868, 874 (1962).
78. See, e.g., Davenport v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 1546 (1975); Kluss v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 572 (1966); Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 1 (1964); Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441 (1943); Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. 105.
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If some or all of the benefits inure to noncharitable entities, there can
be no deduction. In addition, several "for the use of" cases would deny
a deduction unless the activity were carried out with the knowledge
and approval of the charitable organization. 7 9 A taxpayer should not
merit a charitable deduction for engaging in activities that he believes
will benefit a charitable organization unless he gets prior approval
from the charity.8 0 These inquiries are perfectly appropriate as to the
original activity, but they should stop there."'
An additional basis for concluding that section 170(c) does not
preclude deductions for incidental charitable expenses is that one of the
82
earliest definitions of the phrase "for the use of" was "in trust for,"1
which connects the phrase to contributions to private foundations.
This relationship is explicit in the congressional differentiation between
the percentage limitation imposed on contributions "to" charity and
that imposed on contributions "for the use of charity": "[A] charitable
contribution [to which the less stringent limitation applies] must be
paid to the organization and not for the use of the organization.
Accordingly, payments to a trust . . . are not included under this
special rule."'8 3 This interpretation of "for the use of" and its connection with the different percentage limitations on contributions tie the
phrase to private foundations, a distinct problem. 84 If the phrase were
intended to apply only in that context, it should not be used to deny
deductions for expenses incurred in connection with charitable service.
2.

Section 170(f)(3): "Denial of deduction in case of certain
contributions of partial interests in property"

Another potential obstacle to the allocation of general expenses
incident to charitable-personal use is posed by section 170(f)(3) of the
79. See Carsello v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 821 (1976); Doty v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 587 (1974); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973).
80. It seems unnecessarily burdensome, however, to require the taxpayer to ask the specific
permission of his church to use his automobile in the performance of chores he has been requested
to perform by the church, and then require him to ask if he may carry liability insurance on that
automobile.
81. It is also noteworthy that if the phrase "for the use of" functions as a requirement in
this area, it creates the serious internal inconsistency of having expenses such as depreciation,
insurance and repairs of vehicles fail a "for the use of" test, while expenses such as meals and
lodging and commuting pass the test. See pt. I supra.
82. Danz v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 454, 464 (1952), aff'd, 231 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956); see Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 444 (1943); Rev. Rul.
194, 1953-2 C.B. 128, 129.
83. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A53, reprinted in (1954] U.S. Code Cong, &
Ad. News 4017, 4190. A treasury regulation also equates "for the use of" with "in trust for" by
referring to "for the use of' in terms of transfers in trust and transfers of partial interests. Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-8(a)(2) (1972).
84. For a discussion of the distinctions between private foundations and other charitable
institutions, see Stone, The Charitable Foundation: Its Governance, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob.
57, 57-59 (No. 4, 1975).
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Internal Revenue Code, which provides that the rental value of a
donation of a partial interest in property to charity does not qualify as
a deductible contribution."5 This statute opens the door to an argument that certain general expenses associated with an item used in
charitable service are, in effect, equivalent to the rental value of the
item and that, therefore, a deduction for such expenses should be
denied. For instance, it could be argued that if a taxpayer uses his
automobile in order to render charitable services, he is making two
donations-one of services, and one of the use of the automobile-and
that the value of the second donation is the fair rental value of the
automobile. Since depreciation, insurance, maintenance, and other
general expenses would figure prominently in the computation of such
fair rental value, it could be maintained that a taxpayer seeking a
deduction for the general expenses allocable to the charitable work is
actually seeking a deduction for the fair rental value of the automobile.

86

Despite the apparent logic of this argument, section 170(f)(3) should
not be construed to cover the general expenses of an item used in
charitable work. The rental value of the item is an inappropriate
valuation of the donation. In Orr v. United States, 87 a case that arose
before the enactment of section 170(f)(3), the taxpayer argued, in
85. "In the case of a contribution (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest in property
which consists of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property, a deduction shall be
allowed under this section only to the extent that the value of the interest contributed would be
allowable as a deduction under this section if such interest had been transferred in trust. For
purposes of this subparagraph, a contribution by a taxpayer of the right to use property shall be
treated as a contribution of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property." I.R.C.
§ 170(f)(3)(A). This statute reversed existing case law which, after a fairly stormy history, see Fair
v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 866 (1957); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 228 (1951), finally

permitted deductions for the rental value of donations of partial interests to charity. See
Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963). See generally Hofert, Rental
Value of Donated Space as Charitable Contribution, 42 Taxes 745 (1964).

86. Curiously, § 170(f)(3) probably was not intended to cover such items as automobiles The
Senate Finance Committee described the loophole that § 170(f)(3) was designed to close as
follows: "An individual receives what may be described as a double benefit by giving a charity the
right to use property which he owns for a given period of time. For example, if the individual
owns an office building, he may donate the use of 10 percent of its rental space to a charity for
1 year. As a result, he will report for tax purposes only 90 percent of the income which he
otherwise would have had if the building were fully rented, and still may claim a charitable
deduction (amounting to 10 percent of the rental value of the building) which offsets his already
reduced rental income." S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83, reprinted in [1969) U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2027, 2113. Significantly, the double deduction described in the report
would occur only when the property contributed is income-producing property. Property such as
an automobile used in connection with the rendition of charitable services is not incomeproducing; hence, the loophole that gave rise to § 170(f)(3) would not exist. Yet, a partial
interest in any property, whether income-producing or not, comes within the literal terms of the
statute. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A), quoted at note 85 supra.
87. 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
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reliance upon the existing case law, that the use of his vehicles in
connection with charitable work for the Methodist Church should give
rise to a charitable deduction for the rental value of the vehicles. 88 The
court distinguished that case law as follows:
In each of these cases, the charitable organization took possession and had exclusive
control of the property. Here, however, the vehicles remained under the taxpayer's
control at all times. In the circumstances of this case the taxpayer's theory of a gift of
their proportionate use in terms of rental value is an untenable fiction. Since the
Church had neither control nor possession of the airplane and automobile, we cannot
hold that,9 for purposes of a charitable deduction, the Church was using the taxpayer's
8
vehicles.

The court's analysis appears to be correct. When property is used as
an incident to the rendition of charitable service, the property itself is
not given to the charity, even for a limited time. Instead, it is used by
the donor for the benefit of the charity. The proper deduction to the
donor should be the amount expended by him by virtue of this use.
Therefore, if a donor retains control of his property and uses it for the
benefit of a charity, section 170(f)(3) should not apply.
3.

Amounts Paid

Treasury Department regulations provide that "out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services
are deductible" 90 and. that a deduction may be taken for charitable
contributions "actually paid during the taxable year." 9 1 These regulations construe section 170(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
permits a deduction for charitable
contributions, "payment of which is
'92
made within the taxable year."
Case law indicates that depreciation is not an "out-of-pocket expense," "actually paid." In Mitchell v. Commissioner,93 the taxpayer
sought a charitable deduction for a portion of the depreciation of an
automobile which was used partly in connection with his charitable
work. In denying the deduction, the court commented: "Depreciation
is a 'decrease in value.' It is not a payment, or expenditure, or an
out-of-pocket expense. Hence, it cannot be considered as a contribution, payment of which is made within the taxable year." 94 The
Mitchell court also cited the legislative history of the Revenue Act of
1938, 9 5 in which the payment language first appeared. 96 The legisla88. Id. at 555.
89. Id. See also Rutland v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 39 (1977).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(g) (1972) (emphasis added).
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(a)(1) (1972) (emphasis added).
92. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (emphasis added).
93. 42 T.C. 953 (1964).

94. Id. at 973 (citation omitted).
95. Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447 (current version in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
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tive history, however, indicates that the payment terminology was
added to the statute to alleviate confusion as to the timing of the
charitable deduction, not to carve out a category of expenses that

would never qualify for the deduction. 9 7 Orr v. United States9 8
confronted this very point
It is entirely possible, as the taxpayer suggests, that Congress and its Committees
were not thinking of depredation when they used the word "payment". The absence of
any evidence as to whether Congress focused on this problem provides no basis for
extending the meaning of payment to include "depreciation". A depreciation expense is
an indispensable element in accounting. But it is not a "payment", not a transfer of
money or property. We are bound by plain, prosaic language of the statute."

The Orr court may have been compelled to hold as it did in light of
the statutory language and the predominant interpretation of the

depredation expense. In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,

00

how-

ever, the Supreme Court held that depreciation is an "amount paid"

within the meaning of section 263(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 10 1 which provides: "No deduction shall be allowed for.

.

. [a]ny

amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements 0or2
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."

The Court, however, commented in a footnote:
The taxpayer contends that depredation has been held not to be an expenditure or
payment for purposes of a charitable contribution under § 170 of the Code,. . . or for
purposes of a medical-expense deduction under § 213. . . .Section 263 is concerned,
however, with the capital nature of an expenditure and not with its timing, as are the
phrases "payment . . . within the taxable year" or "paid during the taxable year,"
respectively used in §§ 170 and 213. The treatment of depreciation under those
03
sections has no relevance to the issue of capitalization here.'
96. H. R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), reprinted in J. Seidman, Seidman's
Legislative History of the Federal Income Tax Laws 1938-1861, at 16 (1938).
97. "Under the various revenue acts the deduction for contributions is allowed for the taxable
year in which the contribution is made. Hence, a taxpayer on an accrual basis of accounting may
claim that he is entitled to a deduction for the amount of a charitable pledge in one year, although
he does not actually pay it until a later year, or indefinitely postpones payment. The doubt and
confusion in such cases is aggravated by reason of the uncertainty and diversity in the law of the
various States on the question as to when the liability of a subscriber to a charitable fund is fully
incurred. In the interest of certainty in the administration of the revenue laws, it is desirable to
dispel this confusion by enacting a clear and uniform statutory rule to govern this situation.
"The bill provides that the deduction for contributions or gifts for charitable and other purposes
shall be allowed only for the taxable year in which the contribution is actually paid regardless of
whether the taxpayer is reporting income on the cash or the accrual basis. The allowance of the
deduction in the year when actually paid... will eliminate the uncertainty in the administration
of the deduction." Id., reprinted in J.Seidman, supra note 96, at 16-17.
98. 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
99. Id. at 556 (footnote omitted).
100. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
101.

Id. at 16.

102. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1).
103. 418 U.S. at 16 n.11 (citations omitted).
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After Idaho Power, it is not clear whether depreciation is an amount
paid for purposes of section 170, because the opinion does not
directly address that issue. Idaho Power, however, does support the
argument that the payment language in section 170 applies to the
timing of the deduction, and not to the granting of the deduction itself.
Earlier cases had consistently held that depreciation was not an
amount paid. Idaho Power has driven a wedge into this solid front of
authority, leaving some room for argument. Since there is no apparent
justification for treating charitable mixed uses differently from business
mixed uses, the courts should
take advantage of Idaho Power to treat
10 4
these items consistently.

CONCLUSION

Two levels of inferior treatment plague the charitable deduction.
First, statutory restrictions have been imposed by Congress.' 0 1 Second, and more importantly, additional restrictions, which are supported neither by the statutes themselves nor by the policies underlying
these statutes, have developed over time in case law and rulings.
These latter restrictions are evident when mixed motivations and uses
influence a charity-related expense. In contrast with business-related
expenses, which generally give rise to a tax deduction, expenses
incident to charitable activity are considered personal in nature, and
therefore do not merit deductibility. Charitable activity, however, is
not a truly personal activity. It clearly benefits persons and entities
other than the taxpayer himself. Expanding the scope of the charitable
deduction should not create any greater administrative burdens or
encourage any more taxpayer abuse than those presently existing with
respect to business expense deductions. The tax treatment of expenses
related to charitable activities, therefore, should comport with the
treatment accorded trade and business expenses.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the restrictions on the deductibility of expenses incident to charitable, as opposed to business,
activity are based, not on any rational policy, but rather on a general
animus toward the charitable deduction. This animus arises from the
fact that the charitable deduction has been a source of abuse in the
past. The mode of curtailing such abuses, however, should be statutory, as it has been in the business context, rather than judicial. The
time has come for equal treatment.
104. In Weary v. United States, 510 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975),
the taxpayer relied on Idaho Power to claim that depreciation was an "amount paid" for purposes
of the medical expenses deduction. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: "The [amount]
paid out for capital improvements in Idaho Power as compared to the amount paid for medical
services presents too great a difference to convince us that the established doctrine should be
overturned." Id. at 437. But see id. at 437-38 (Christensen, J., dissenting).
105. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.

